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Absolutely and asymptotically secure protocols for organizing an exam in a quantum way are
proposed basing judiciously on multipartite entanglement. The protocols are shown to stand against
common types of eavesdropping attack.
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1. Introduction
Simultaneous distance-independent correlation between different systems called entanglement [1] is the most char-
acteristic trait that sharply distinguishes between quantum and classical worlds. At present entanglement between
two systems, i.e. bipartite entanglement, is quite well understood, but that between more than two systems, i.e.
multipartite entanglement, remains still far from being satisfactorily known. In spite of that, multipartite entangle-
ment has proven to play a superior role in recently emerging fields of quantum information processing and quantum
computing since it exhibits a much richer structure than bipartite entanglement. Motivation for studying multipartite
entanglement arises from many reasons some of which are listed now. First, multipartite entanglement provides a
unique means to check the Einstein locality without invoking statistical arguments [2], contrary to the case of Bell
inequalities using bipartite entanglement. Second, multipartite entanglement serves as a key ingredient for quantum
computing to achieve an exponential speedup over classical computation [3]. Third, multipartite entanglement is
central to quantum error correction [4] where it is used to encode states, to detect errors and, eventually, to allow
fault-tolerant quantum computation [5], Fourth, multipartite entanglement helps to better characterize the critical
behavior of different many-body quantum systems giving rise to a unified treatment of the quantum phase transitions
[6]. Fifth, multipartite entanglement is crucial also in condensed matter phenomena and might solve some unresolved
problems such as high-T superconductivity [7]. Sixth, multipartite entanglement is recognized as a unreplaceable or
efficient resource to perform tasks involving a large number of parties such as network teleportation [8], quantum
cryptography [9], quantum secret sharing [10], remote entangling [11], quantum (tele)cloning [12], quantum Byzantine
agreement [13], etc. Finally, multipartite entanglement is conjectured to yield a wealth of fascinating and unexplored
physics [14]. Current research in multipartite entanglement is progressing along two directions in parallel. One di-
rection deals with problems such as how to classify [15], quantify [16], generate/control/distill [17] and witness [18]
multipartite entanglement. The other direction proceeds to advance various applications exploiting the nonclassical
multiway correlation inherent in multipartite entanglement [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. Our work here belongs to the second
direction mentioned above. Namely, we propose protocols to organize the so-called quantum exam which will be
specified in the next section. To meet the necessary confidentiality of the exam we use suitable multipartite GHZ
entangled states [2] as the quantum channel. We consider two scenarios. One scenario is absolutely secure provided
that the participants share a prior proper multipartite entanglement. The other scenario can be performed directly
without any nonlocal quantum arrangements in the past but it is only asymptotically secure. Both the scenarios are
shown to stand against commonly utilized eavesdropping attacks.
2. Quantum exam
Exploiting the superdense coding feature possessed in bipartite entanglement we have recently proposed a quantum
dialogue scheme [19] (see also [20]) allowing two legitimate parties to securely carry out their conversation. In this
work multipartite entanglement will be judiciously exploited to do a more sophisticated task. Suppose that a teacher
Alice wishes to organize an important exam with her remotely separate students Bob 1, Bob 2, ..... and Bob N.
Alice gives her problem to all Bobs and, after some predetermined period of time, asks each Bob to return a solution
independently. Alice’s problem should be kept confidential from any outsiders. The solution of a Bob should be
accessible only to Alice but not to anyone else including the N − 1 remaining Bobs. Such confidentiality constraints
cannot be maintained even when Alice and Bobs are connected by authentic classical channels because any classical
communication could be eavesdropped perfectly without a track left behind. However, combined with appropriate
quantum channels such an exam is accomplishable. We call it quantum exam, i.e. an exam organized in a quantum
way to guarantee the required secrecy.
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2Let Alice’s problem is a binary string
Q = {qm} (1)
and the solution of a Bob is another string
Rn = {rnm} (2)
where n = 1, 2, ..., N labels the Bob while qm, rnm ∈ {0, 1} with m = 1, 2, 3, ... denote a secret bit of Alice and a
Bob.
2.1. Absolutely secure protocol
An exam consists of two stages. In the first stage Alice gives a problem to Bobs and in the second stage she collects
Bobs’ solutions.
The problem-giving process
To securely transfer the problem from Alice to Bobs the following steps are to be proceeded.
a1) Alice and Bobs share beforehand a large number of ordered identical (N + 1)-partite GHZ states in the form
|Ψm〉 ≡ |Ψ〉am1m...Nm =
1√
2
(|00...0〉am1m...Nm + |11...1〉am1m...Nm
)
(3)
of which qubits am are with Alice and qubits nm with Bob n.
a2) For a given m, Alice measures her qubit am in the basis Bz = {|0〉 , |1〉}, then asks Bobs to do so with their
qubits nm. All the parties obtain the same outcome j
z
m where j
z
m = 0 (j
z
m = 1) if they find |0〉 (|1〉).
a3) Alice publicly broadcasts the value xm = qm ⊕ jzm (⊕ denotes an addition mod 2).
a4) Each Bob decodes Alice’s secret bit as qm = xm ⊕ jzm.
This problem-giving process is absolutely secure because jzm, for each m, takes on the value of either 0 or 1 with
an equal probability resulting in a truly random string {jzm} which Alice uses as a one-time-pad to encode her secret
problem {qm} simultaneously for all Bobs who also use {jzm} to decode Alice’s problem.
The solution-collecting process
After a predetermined period of time depending on the problem difficulty level Alice collects the solution from
independent Bobs as follows.
b1) Alice and Bobs share beforehand a large number of ordered nonidentical (N +1)-partite GHZ states in the form
|Φm〉 ≡ |Φ〉am1m...Nm = Um |Ψ〉am1m...Nm (4)
with
Um = Iam ⊗ u(s1m)⊗ u(s2m)⊗ ...⊗ u(sNm) (5)
where Iam is the identity operator acting on qubit am and
u(snm) = (|0〉 〈1|+ |1〉 〈0|)snm (6)
is a unitary operator acting on qubit nm. For each n and m, the value of snm chosen at random between 0 and
1 is known only to Alice but by no means to any other person including Bobs. Qubits am are with Alice and
qubits nm with Bob n.
b2) For a given m, Alice measures her qubit am in Bz with the outcome jzam = {0, 1}, then asks Bobs to do so with
their qubits nm with the outcome j
z
nm
= {0, 1}.
b3) Each Bob n publicly broadcasts the value ynm = rnm ⊕ jznm .
3b4) Alice decodes the solution of Bob n as rnm = ynm ⊕
[
δ0,snm j
z
am
+ δ1,snm (j
z
am
⊕ 1)] .
In the solution-collecting process the outcomes jzam and j
z
nm
are not the same anymore in general, but they are
dynamically correlated as jznm = δ0,snm j
z
am
+ δ1,snm (j
z
am
⊕ 1). This correlation allows only Alice who knows the value
of {snm} to decode the solution of a Bob after she obtains her own measurement outcome jzam . As is clear, each of the
N strings {jz
1m
}, {jz
2m
}, ..., {jzNm} appears truly random and each such a string is used by a Bob and Alice only one
time to encode/decode a secret solution {rnm}. The above solution-collecting process is therefore absolutely secure as
well.
The essential condition to ensure absolute security of the quantum exam is a prior sharing of the entangled states
{|Ψm〉} and {|Φm〉} between the teacher Alice and the students Bobs. It is therefore necessary to propose methods
for multipartite entanglement sharing.
The |Ψm〉-sharing process
Alice and Bobs can securely share the states {|Ψm〉} as follows.
c1) Alice generates a large enough number of identical states |Ψm〉 defined in Eq. (3) [21]. For each such state she
keeps qubit am and sends qubits 1m, 2m, ..., Nm to Bob 1, Bob 2, ..., Bob N, respectively. Before sending a
qubit nm Alice authenticates Bob n of that action.
c2) After receiving a qubit each Bob also authenticates Alice independently.
c3) Alice selects at random a subset {|Ψl〉} out of the shared |Ψm〉-states and lets Bobs know that subset. For each
state of the subset Alice measures her qubit randomly in Bz or in Bx = {|+〉 , |−〉} with |±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/
√
2}.
Then she asks every Bob to measure their qubits in the same basis as hers. Alice’s (Bobs’) outcome in Bz
is jzal(j
z
nl
) = {0, 1} corresponding to finding {|0〉 , |1〉} and that in Bx is jxal(jxnl) = {+1,−1} corresponding to
finding {|+〉 , |−〉}.
c4) Alice requires each Bob to publicly reveal the outcome of each his measurement and makes an analysis. For
those measurements in Bz she compares jzal with jznl : if jzal = jznl ∀n it is all-right, otherwise she realizes a
possible attack of an outsider Eve in the quantum channel. As for measurements in Bx she compares jxal with
Jxl =
∏N
n=1 j
x
nl
: if jxal = J
x
l it is all-right [22], otherwise there is Eve in the line. If the error rate exceeds a
predetermined small value Alice tells Bobs to restart the whole process, otherwise they record the order of the
remaining shared |Ψm〉-states and can use them for the problem-giving process following the steps from a1) to
a4).
The |Φm〉-sharing process
The states {|Φm〉} cab be securely shared between the participants as follows.
d1) Alice generates a large enough number of identical states {|Ψm〉} [21]. She then applies on each of the identical
states a unitary operator Up determined by Eq. (5) to transform them into the |Φp〉-states defined in Eq. (4)
which are nonidentical states [23]. Afterward, for each |Φp〉 , she keeps qubit ap and sends qubits 1p, 2p, ..., Np
to Bob 1, Bob 2, ..., Bob N, respectively. Before sending a qubit np Alice authenticates Bob n of that action.
d2) After receiving a qubit each Bob also authenticates Alice independently.
d3) Alice selects at random a large enough subset {|Φl〉} out of the shared |Φp〉-states and lets Bobs know that
subset. For each state |Φl〉 of the subset Alice measures her qubit randomly in either Bz or Bx, then asks Bobs
to measure their qubits in the same basis as hers.
d4) Alice requires each Bob to publicly reveal the outcome of each his measurement and makes a proper analysis.
For those measurements in Bz she verifies the equalities jzal = δ0,snl jznl + δ1,snl (jznl ⊕ 1). If the equalities hold for
every n it is all-right, otherwise the quantum channel was attacked. As for measurements in Bx she compares
jxal with J
x
l =
∏N
n=1 j
x
nl
: if jxal = J
x
l it is all-right [24], otherwise the quantum channel was attacked. If the
error rate exceeds a predetermined value Alice tells Bobs to restart the whole process, otherwise they record
the order of the remaining shared |Φp〉-states and can use them for the solution-collecting process following the
steps from b1) to b4).
Security of the entanglement-sharing process
To gain useful information about the exam, Eve must attack the quantum channel during the entanglement-sharing
process. Below are several types of attack that Eve commonly uses.
4Measure-Resend Attack. In Bz Eve measures the qubits emerging from Alice and then resends them on to Bobs.
After Eve’s measurement the entangled state collapses into a product state and her attack is detectable when Alice
and Bobs use Bx for a security check [25].
Disturbance Attack. If Alice and Bobs check security only by measurement outcomes in Bx, then Eve, though
cannot gain any information, is able to make the protocol to be denial-of-service. Namely, for each n, on the way
from Alice to Bob n, Eve applies on qubit n an operator u(vnm) as defined in Eq. (6) with vnm randomly taken as
either 0 or 1, then lets the qubit go on its way. By doing so the disturbed states become truly random and totally
unknown to everybody, hence no cryptography is possible at all. Though measurements in Bx cannot detect this type
of attack [26], those in Bz can [27].
Entangle-Measure Attack. Eve may steal some information by entangling her ancilla (prepared, say, in the state
|χ〉E) with a qubit n (assumed to be in the state |i〉n) before the qubit reaches Bob n : |χ〉E |i〉n → α |χi〉E |i〉n +
β |χi〉E |i⊕ 1〉n where |α|2+ |β|2 = 1 and E 〈χi |χi〉E = 0. After Bob n measures his qubit Eve does so with her ancilla
and thus can learn about the Bob’s outcome. Yet, with a probability of |β|2 Eve finds |χi〉E in which case she is
detected if the security check by Alice and Bobs is performed in Bz [28].
Intercept-Resend Attack. Eve may create her own entangled states |Ψ′〉a′m1′m...N ′m (|Φ
′〉a′m1′m...N ′m = U
′
m |Ψ′〉a′m1′m...N ′m
where U ′m = Ia′m ⊗ u(s′1m)⊗ u(s′2m)⊗ ...⊗ u(s′Nm) with {s′nm} an arbitrary random string). Then she keeps qubit a′m
and sends qubit n′m to Bob n.When Alice sends qubits nm to Bobs Eve captures and stores all of them. Subsequently,
after Alice’s and Bobs’ measurements, Eve also measures her qubits a′m and the qubits nm she has kept to learn the
corresponding keys. This attack is detected as well when Alice and Bobs use Bz-measurement outcomes for their
security-check [29].
Masquerading Attack. Eve may pretend to be a Bob in the |Ψm〉-sharing process to later obtain Alice’s problem.
Likewise, she may pretend to be Alice in the |Φ′m〉-sharing process to later collect Bobs’ solutions. Such pretenses are
excluded because each Bob after receiving a qubit has to inform Alice and Alice before sending a qubit has also to
inform all Bobs. The classical communication channels Alice and Bobs possess have been assumed highly authentic
so that any disguisement must be disclosed.
2.2. Asymptotically secure protocol
In some circumstances an urgent exam needs to be organized but no prior quantum nonlocal arrangements are
available at all. We now propose a protocol to directly accomplish such an urgent task. At that aim, Alice has to have
at hand a large number of states {|Ψm〉} and {|Φm〉 = Um |Ψm〉}. Let M (M ′) be length of Alice’s problem (Bobs’
solution) and T the time provided for Bobs to solve the problem.
The direct problem-giving process
Alice can directly give her problem to Bobs by “running” the following program.
e1) m = 0.
e2) m = m+ 1. Alice picks up a state |Ψm〉 , keeps qubit am and sends qubits 1m, 2m, ..., Nm to Bob 1, Bob 2, ...,
Bob N, respectively. Before doing so Alice informs all Bobs via her authentic classical channels.
e3) Each Bob confirms receipt of a qubit via their authentic classical channels.
e4) Alice switches between two operating modes: the control mode (CM) with rate c and the message mode (MM)
with rate 1− c. Alice lets Bobs know which operating mode she chose.
e4.1) If CM is chosen, Alice measures qubit am randomly in Bz or Bx with an outcome jzam or jxam , then lets Bobs
know her basis choice and, asks them to measure their qubits nm in the chosen basis. After measurements
each Bob publicly publishes his outcome jznm or j
x
nm
. Alice analyzes the outcomes: if jzam = j
z
1m
= jz
2m
=
... = jzNm or j
x
am
=
∏N
n=1 j
x
nm
she sets m = m − 1 and goes to step e2) to continue, else she tells Bobs to
reinitialize from the beginning by going to step e1).
e4.2) If MM is chosen, Alice measures qubit am in Bz with an outcome jzam and publicly reveals xm = jzam ⊕ qm.
Each Bob measures his qubit also in Bz with an outcome jznm , then decodes Alice’s secret bit as qm =
jznm ⊕xm. If m < M Alice goes to step e2) to continue, else she publicly announces: “My problem has been
transferred successfully to all of you. Please return your solution after time T ”.
The direct solution-collecting process
After time T Alice can directly collect Bobs’ solutions by “running” another program as follows.
g1) m = 0.
5g2) m = m+ 1. Alice picks up a |Φm〉 , keeps qubit am and sends qubits 1m, 2m, ..., Nm to Bob 1, Bob 2, ..., Bob
N, respectively. Before doing so Alice informs all Bobs via her authentic classical channels.
g3) Each Bob confirms receipt of a qubit via their authentic classical channels.
g4) Alice switches between two operating modes: the CM with rate c and the MM with rate 1 − c. Alice lets Bobs
know which operating mode she chose.
g4.1) If CM is chosen, Alice measures qubit am randomly in Bz or Bx with an outcome jzam or jxam , then
lets Bobs know her basis choice and, asks them to measure their qubits nm in the chosen basis. After
measurements each Bob publicly publishes his outcome jznm or j
x
nm
. Alice analyzes the outcomes: if jzam =
δ0,snm j
z
nm
+ δ1,snm (j
z
nm
⊕ 1) for every n or jxam =
∏N
n=1 j
x
nm
she sets m = m − 1 and goes to step g2) to
continue, else she tells Bobs to reinitialize from the beginning by going to step g1).
g4.2) If MM is chosen, Alice measures qubit am in Bz with an outcome jzam and each Bob measures his qubit also
in Bz with an outcome jznm . Each Bob publicly reveals ynm = rnm ⊕ jznm and Alice decodes Bobs’ secret
bits as rnm = ynm ⊕
[
δ0,snm j
z
am
+ δ1,snm (j
z
am
⊕ 1)] for n = 1, 2, ..., N. If m < M ′ Alice goes to step g2) to
continue, else she publicly announces: “Your solutions have been collected successfully”.
As described above, in the direct problem-giving (solution-collecting) process Alice alternatively gives (collects)
secret bits and checks Eve’s eavesdropping. These direct protocols also stand against the types of attack mentioned
above. The protocols terminate immediately whenever Eve is detected in a control mode. However, Eve might get a
partial information before her tampering is disclosed. Such an information leakage can be reduced as much as Alice
wants by increasing the control mode rate c at the expense of reducing the information transmission rate r = 1 − c.
For short strings Q and Rn (see Eq. (1) and Eq. (2)) Eve’s detection probability may be quite small. But, the longer
the strings the higher the detection probability. In the long-string limit the detection probability approaches one, i.e.
Eve is inevitably detected. In this sense, the direct quantum exam protocols are asymptotically secure only.
3. Conclusion
We have proposed two protocols for organizing a quantum exam [30] basing on a judicious use of appropriate
multipartite entangled states. The first protocol is absolutely secure iff the participants have successfully shared
the necessary entanglement in advance. We also provide methods for sharing the multipartite entanglement in the
presence of a potential eavesdropping outsider. The second protocol can be processed directly without a prior entan-
glement sharing. This advantage is however compromised by a lower confidentiality level or by a slower information
transmission rate. Both the protocols have been shown to sustain various kinds of attacks such as measure-resend
attack, disturbance attack, entangle-measure attack, intercept-resend attack and masquerading attack. Our protocols
work well in an idealized situation with perfect entanglement sources/measuring devices and in noiseless quantum
channels which we have assumed for simplicity. We are planning to further develop our protocols to cope with more
realistic situations.
Acknowledgments.
The author is grateful to Professor Hai-Woong Lee from KAIST for useful discussion and comments. This research
was supported by a Grant (TRQCQ) from the Ministry of Science and Technology of Korea and also by a KIAS R&D
Fund No 6G014904.
[1] E. Schro¨dinger, Naturwiss. 23 (1935) 807.
[2] D.M. Greenberger, M.A. Horne, A. Zeilinger, in: M. Kafatos (Ed.), Bell’s Theorem, Quantum Theory and Conceptions of
the Universe, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1989, p.69;
H.J. Bernstein, Foundation Phys. 29 (1999) 521.
[3] R. Jozsa, N. Linden, quant-ph/0201143.
[4] A.J. Scott, Phys. Rev. A 69 (2004) 052330.
[5] M.A. Nielsen, I.L. Chuang, Quantum Computation and Quantum Information, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2000, p. 513.
[6] S. Sachdev, Quantum Phase Transitions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 2000;
A. Anfossi, P. Giorda, A. Montorsi, F. Traversa, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95 (2005) 056402.
[7] V. Vedral, New J. Phys. 6 (2004) 22.
6[8] A. Karlsson, M. Bourennane, Phys. Rev. A 58 (1998) 4394;
P. van Loock, S.L. Braunstein, Phys. Rev. Lett. 84 (2000) 3482;
P. van Loock, S.L. Braunstein, Phys. Rev. Lett. 87 (2001) 247901;
V.N. Gorbachev, A.I. Trubilko, A.I. Zhibila, J. Opt. B: Quantum Semiclss. 3 (2001) S25;
Nguyen Ba An, Phys. Rev. A 68 (2003) 022321.
[9] J. Kempe, Phys. Rev. A 60 (1999) 910;
G. A. Durkin, C. Simon, D. Bouwmeester, Phys. Rev. Lett. 88 (2004) 187902.
[10] R. Cleve, D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, Phys. Rev. Lett. 83 (1999), 648;
M. Hillery, V. Buzek, A. Berthiaume, Phys. Rev. A 59 (1999) 1829.
[11] A.K. Pati, Pramana-J. Phys. 59 (2002) 217;
Nguyen Ba An, Phys. Rev. A 69 (2004) 022315.
[12] D. Bruss, D. P. DiVincenzo, A. Ekert, C. A. Fuchs, C. Macchiavello, J. A. Smolin, Phys. Rev. A 57 (1998) 2368;
M. Murao, D. Jonathan, M. B. Plenio, V. Vedral, Phys. Rev. A 59 (1999) 156;
C.-W. Zhang, C.-F. Li, Z.-Y. Wang, G.-C. Guo, Phys. Rev. A 62 (2000) 042302.
[13] M. Fitzi, N. Gisin, U. Maurer, Phys. Rev. Lett. 87 (2001) 217901.
[14] J. Preskill, J. Mod. Opt. 47 (2000) 127.
[15] W. Dur, G. Vidal, J.I. Cirac, Phys. Rev. A 62 (2000) 062314.
[16] G. Adesso, A. Serafini, F. Illuminati, Phys. Rev. Lett. 93 (2004) 220405;
C. S. Yu, H. S. Song, Phys. Rev. A 71 (2005) 042331.
[17] X. Wang, B.C. Sanders, Phys. Rev. A 65 (2002) 012303;
M. Eibl, S. Gaertner, M. Bourennane, C. Kurtsiefer, M. Zukowski, H. Weinfurter, Phys. Rev. Lett. 90 (2003) 200403;
Nguyen Ba An, J. Kim, quant-ph/0303149;
H. Mikami, Y. Li, T. Kobayashi, Phys. Rev. 70 (2004) 052308;
A. Olaya-Castro, N.F. Johnson, L. Quiroga, Phys. Rev. A 70 (2004) 020301(R);
P.B. Stiffell, M.J. Everitt, T.D. Clark, C.J. Harland, J.F. Ralph, Phys. Rev. B 72 (2005) 014508;
A. Olaya-Castro, N.F. Johnson, L. Quiroga, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94 (2005) 110502;
Nguyen Ba An, Phys. Lett. A 344 (2005) 77;
W. Dur, J. Calsamiglia, H.J. Briegel, Phys. Rev. A 71 (2005) 042336.
[18] A.C. Doherty, P.A. Parrilo, F.M. Spedalieri, Phys. Rev. A 71 (2005) 032333;
G. To´th, O. Gu¨hne, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94 (2005) 060501.
[19] Nguyen Ba An, Phys. Lett. A 328 (2004) 6;
Nguyen Ba An, J. Kor. Phys. Soc. (2005) in print.
[20] S.S. Jang, H.W. Lee, Phys. Lett. A 339 (2005) 430.
[21] A state |Ψm〉 ≡ |Ψ〉am1m...Nm can be generated from the product state |00...0〉am1m...Nm as |Ψ〉am1m...Nm = CNOTamNm⊗
...⊗CNOTam2m⊗CNOTam1m⊗Ham |00...0〉am1m...Nm , where CNOTxy is a control-NOT gate with x (y) being the control
(target) qubit and Hx is the Hadamard gate acting on qubit x.
[22] This checking strategy comes out from the fact that a state |Ψ〉al1l...Nl always has a positive parity, i.e. j
x
al
∏N
n=1 j
x
nl
= +1
definitely.
[23] Since each Up is managed by Alice alone, she is the only one who knows the parameters s1p , s2p , ..., sNp though each of
them is randomly chosen between 0 and 1. That is, only Alice is able to distinguish states |Φp〉 with certainty.
[24] This checking strategy comes out from the fact that a state |Φ〉
al1l...Nl
also has definitely a positive parity.
[25] This is because any product state |iai1i2...iN 〉a1...N with ia, in ∈ {0, 1}, when measured in Bx, yields either “plus” or
“minus” parity with an equal probability.
[26] Because any entangled state
(|iai1i2...iN 〉a1...N +
∣
∣iai1i2...iN
〉
a1...N
)
/
√
2, with i the negation of i = {0, 1}, has definitely a
positive parity.
[27] Because vnm 6= snm in general.
[28] Because in this case what Bob actually finds is |i⊕ 1〉
n
instead of the should-be |i〉
n
.
[29] Because there are no correlations at all between qubit am and qubits n
′
m.
[30] If one likes, the name “quantum exam” can alternatively be replaced by “quantum multiparty interview” (or “quantum
ballot”) for which Alice plays the role of the interviewer (or the selection committee chair) and Bobs play the role of
interviewees (or balloters).
